Information Dissemination in Currency Crises

I The Classical Currency Crisis Models.- 1 First-Generation Model - Krugman (1979).- 1.1 The Classical First-Generation Model by Krugman (1979).- 1.2 Modifications of the First-Generation Model.- 1.2.1 Sterilizing Money-Supply Effects.- 1.2.2 Sterilization and Risk Premia.- 1.2.3 Assuming Uncertainties.- 2 Second-Generation Model - Obstfeld (1994).- 2.1 The Classical Second-Generation Model by Obstfeld (1994).- 2.2 Empirical Tests.- II Self-Fulfilling Currency Crisis Model with Unique Equilibrium - Morris and Shin (1998).- 3 Introduction.- 4 Game-Theoretic Preliminaries.- 4.1 Games, Strategies and Information.- 4.2 Solving Coordination Games.- 4.3 Equilibrium Selection in Global Games - Carlsson and van Damme (1993).- 4.4 Generalizing the Method to n-Player, 2-Action Games.- 5 Solving Currency Crisis Models in Global Games — The Morris/Shin-Model (1998).- 5.1 The Basic Model by Morris and Shin (1998).- 5.2 Interpretation of the Results.- 6 Transparency and Expectation Formation in the Basic Morris/Shin-Model (1998).- 6.1 Transparency.- 6.2 Expectation Formation.- III The Influence of Private and Public Information in Self-Fulfilling Currency Crisis Models.- 7 Introduction.- 8 Characterization of Private and Public Information.- 9 The Currency Crisis Model with Private and Public Information.- 9.1 The Structure of the Model.- 9.2 The Complete Information Case - Multiple Equilibria..- 9.3 Incomplete Public Information - Multiple Equilibria versus Unique Equilibrium.- 9.4 Incomplete Public and Private Information ¨C Unique Equilibrium.- 9.4.1 Derivation of the Unique Equilibrium.- 9.4.2 The Uniqueness Condition.- 9.5 Comparative Statics.- 9.6 Unique versus Multiple Equilibria and the Importance of Private and Public Information.- 9.7 Conclusion.- 10 Optimal Information Policy - Endogenizing Information Precision.- 10.1 The Model.- 10.2 Optimal Risk Taking and Information Policy.- 10.3 Conclusion.- IV Informational Aspects of Speculators' Size and Dynamics.- 11 Introduction.- 12 Currency Crisis Models with Small and Large Traders.- 12.1 The Basic Model with Small and Large Traders - Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2001).- 12.2 Simplified Model..- 12.2.1 The Derivation of Equilibrium.- 12.2.2 Comparative Statics.- 12.3 Conclusion.- 13 Informational Cascades and Herds: Aspects of Dynamics and Time.- 13.1 Herding Behavior and Informational Cascades.- 13.1.1 The Model by Banerjee (1993).- 13.1.2 The Model by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).- 13.2 Currency Crises as Dynamic Coordination Games ¨C Dasgupta (2001).- 13.2.1 The Static Benchmark Case.- 13.2.2 Dynamic Game with Exogenous Order.- 13.2.3 Dynamic Game with Endogenous Order.- 13.3 Large Traders in Dynamic Coordination Games.- V Testing the Theoretical Results.- 14 Introduction.- 15 Experimental Evidence.- 16 Empirical Evidence.- 16.1 The Asian Crisis 1997-98 - Empirical Tests by Prati and Sbracia (2001).- 16.2 The Mexican Peso Crisis 1994-95 - Descriptive Evidence.- 16.2.1 The Venue of the Mexican Crisis.- 16.2.2 Combining the Observations with Theoretical Results.- VI Concluding Thoughts.- Reference.