Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity

Preface. Part I: Introduction. 1. Introduction and Overview; J. Friedman. 2. A Review of Refinements, Equilibrium Selection, and Repeated Games; J. Friedman. 3. Coordination in Games: a Survey; G. Biglaiser. Part II: General Issues in Coordination. 4. Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory; M. Rabin. 5. On the Concepts of Strategy and Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games; W. Stanford. 6. The `Folk Theorem' for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules; J. Friedman, L. Samuelson. 7. Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Pre-Paly Communication; R. Cooper, D. DeJong, R. Forsythe, T. Ross. Part III: Coordination in Specific Economic Contexts. 8. The Dynamics of Bandwagons; J. Farrell, C. Shapiro. 9. Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability; A. Blume, R. Riezman. 10. Coordination Theory, the Stag Hunt and Macroeconomics; J. Bryant. Index.